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Abstract
In this paper we empirically investigate the theoretical results obtained in
Zaby (2009). From the theoretical model, which introduces the decision to
patent into a setting with horizontally differentiated products we deduce
several hypotheses and test these empirically. We find that the propensity
to patent increases when market entry costs decrease. Furthermore, if the
disclosure requirement linked to a patent has an impact, the propensity to
patent decreases with the strength of the disclosure effect.
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1 Introduction
In their seminal empirical study Cohen et al. (2000) find that firms do not
patent every invention. Cohen et al. (2000) isolate the two key reasons for
firms not to patent as (i) the amount of information disclosed in a patent
application and (ii) the ease of legally inventing around a patent. Empirical
findings of Arundel (2001) support these results: Analyzing the relative im-
portance of secrecy versus patents he finds that a higher percentage of firms
in all size classes rate secrecy as more valuable than patents.
The aim of this paper is to empirically analyze the influence of the disclosure
requirement on the propensity to patent. Naturally the loss of a technological
leadership caused by the disclosure of proprietary knowledge will lead the
patentee to fear that the transfer of this enabling knowledge may benefit his
rivals by facilitating the imitation of the protected invention. In the end this
may lead him to refrain from patenting.
The starting point of our empirical investigation is the theoretical model
presented in Zaby (2009), where the possibility of patenting is introduced
into an oligopolistic model of horizontally differentiated products. The main
assumptions of the theoretical model are (i) a drastic product innovation is
released on a new market where rivals may enter with non-infringing products
as patent protection is not perfect; (ii) the strength of patent protection
is measured by the breadth of a patent (iii) the information revealed due
to the disclosure requirement reduces competitor’s market entry costs, this
facilitates inventing around so that possibly more firms are able to enter the
market due to a patent. Thus the positive effect of patent protection may be
opposed by the negative effect of the required disclosure.
Zaby (2009) finds two forces which drive the patenting decision: the strength
of patent protection and the impact of the disclosure requirement. If the
impact of the disclosure requirement is rather weak, the protective effect of
the patent is decisive for the innovator’s appropriation decision - the broader
a patent, the higher is his propensity to patent. If the impact of the dis-
closure requirement is high, the positive effect of patent protection may be
outweighed by the effect of the mandatory disclosure: due to the increasing
threat of market entry the innovator will then possibly refrain from patenting.
To implement this model empirically we use information of the Mannheim
Innovation Panel (MIP) from the year 2005. The MIP is intended to reg-
ularly reflect several characteristics of the innovation activities of German
manufacturing and service firms, e.g. R&D and innovation expenditures, as
well as IP protection methods. In the year 2005, firms were asked to assess
their competitive situation with respect to the characteristics of competition
(price, quality, etc. ), as well as with respect to their competitors (number,
size, etc. ).
We estimate a probit model in order to test the impact of market entry
costs and the balancing of the positive and negative effect of patenting on
firms’ propensity to patent. As the theoretical model predicts different out-
comes for the considered cases the disclosure requirement has no impact vs.
the disclosure requirement has an impact we introduce interaction terms of
the disclosure requirement indicator with market entry costs as well as with
patent breadth, where the latter reflects the positive protective effect of a
patent. Our conjectures regarding the signs are in line with the results of the
theoretical model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The following section gives a
brief summary of the theoretical model presented in Zaby (2009). In Section
3 we deduce several hypotheses from the theoretical model and present their
empirical implementation. The following Section 4 describes the data set
and our proceeding in restricting the data sample and defining the variables.
Section 5 presents our empirical results and Section 6 concludes.
2 The theoretical model
In this section we will briefly present the basic setup of the theoretical model,
especially pointing to aspects central to our empirical implementation. The
starting point of the three stage game presented in Zaby (2009) is that one
firm has successfully accomplished a drastic product innovation and decides
to release the new product immediately. As this innovative firm owns the
proprietary knowledge concerning the innovation, it will be monopolist in the
new market as long as no other firm successfully invents. The new product
may be varied horizontally in its product characteristics which are assumed
to be continuously distributed on a circle of unit-circumference. The innova-
tor (and any other entering firm) can only offer one variant of the good. If
a consumer cannot buy a good according to his preference he incurs a disu-
tility that rises quadratically with the distance between his preferred good
and the offered good. We will refer to this disutility as mismatch costs. Each
consumer purchases one unit of the good as long as his net utility is weakly
positive.
The structure of the model is as follows: on the first stage of the three-stage
game the innovator, already located in the new market, decides whether to
patent his innovation or to keep it secret. A patent protects a given range
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of product space on the unit circle against the entry of rival firms. The
extent of protection is defined by the breadth of the patent, β ∈ ]0, 1[, which
is exogenous. Zaby (2009) defines the protected product space as situated
symmetrically around the location of the patentee’s product, see Figure 1.
From there patent protection covers β/2 of the neighboring product space on
either side of the innovation.
Figure 1: Patent Breadth
location of the innovator
β/2β/2
On the second stage n potential rivals, n ∈ [0, ∞[, simultaneously decide
whether to enter the new market, given the patenting decision of the innova-
tor. Thus the number of firms operating in the market amounts toNu = n+1,
u = P, S. Upon entry all firms face market entry costs. These can be under-
stood as the costs necessary to achieve the capability to produce a variant of
the new product. If the innovator decides to patent his discovery, according
to patent law he is required to disclose sufficient information so that anyone
skilled in the art is able to reproduce the patented product. Although his
competitors are not allowed to copy the protected product, they have the
possibility to invent around the patent as long as patent breadth does not
deter entry completely, β < 1. Whenever a rival decides to enter the mar-
ket despite of a patent, he profits from the disclosed information: achieving
the capability to enter the new market is now easier and thus less costly. If
market entry costs in the case of secrecy amount to fs, then in the case of
a patent they decrease to fP with fP ≡ αfs, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, where α is a mea-
sure for the impact of the disclosure requirement which may differ subject to
specific market conditions. Concerning the location of firms, we will use the
well established principle of maximum differentiation meaning that firms will
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locate as far away from each other as possible to soften price competition.1
Thus, if secrecy prevails, firms will locate equidistantly on the unit circle.
With a patent potential entrants cannot freely locate on the unit circle due
to the range of protected product space. Still, they will try to move as close
as possible to their profit maximizing, equidistant locations. Consequently,
in the case of a patent, when the choice of location is restricted to the product
space 1−β, the direct neighbors of the patentee will locate at the borders of
the patent and all other entrants will locate equidistantly between them.
Note that as long as the breadth of the patent is rather moderate, β/2 <
1/NP , the patent does not influence the location of rival firms and the sym-
metric result emerges. Nevertheless, due to the assumption that the disclo-
sure requirement lowers market entry costs, fP < fs, more firms than in the
case without a patent might enter the market. If the protectional degree of
the patent is high,
β
2
≥
1
NP
, (1)
equidistant location on the entire circumference of the circle is no longer
possible as the patent restricts the locations for entering firms to the product
space 1−β. Following Zaby (2009) patents in a setting where patent breadth,
β, fulfills condition (1) are denoted as restrictive patents. The following figure
depicts firm’s locations with NP = 4 for the cases (a) that the patent is not
restrictive (β < 1/2), and (b) that the patent is restrictive (β ≥ 1/2).
Figure 2: Firm’s Locations with a Patent, NP = 4
i
k h
k + 1
(a) non-restrictive patent
i
k h
k + 1
(b) restrictive patent
1Kats (1995) shows that this principle leads to a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in
a price then location game in a circular market.
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On the third stage all firms in the new market compete in prices.
The patenting decision is mainly driven by two factors: On the one hand
the fact whether a patent is restrictive or not is crucial for the innovator’s
appropriation strategy, and on the other hand the impact of the disclosure
requirement plays a decisive role. The later depends on the extent to which
market entry costs decrease by patenting. Either the influence of the disclo-
sure requirement is such that the number of firms able to enter the market
is left unchanged, NS = Np, or it is such that the number of firms increases,
NP > NP . In the later case a major decrease of market entry costs allows
more firms to enter, thus the disclosure requirement has an impact. In the
first case - if patenting only leads to a minor (or no) decrease - the number
of firms will remain the same independent of the appropriation decision of
the innovator, the disclosure requirement has no impact.
The main results of the theoretical model differ subject to the impact of the
disclosure requirement: Whenever the disclosure requirement has no impact,
the patenting decision is solely driven by the protective effect – the broader
a patent is, the higher is the innovator’s propensity to patent. Other than
this, whenever the disclosure requirement has an impact, Zaby (2009) finds
that the propensity to patent decreases with the strength of the disclosure
effect.
3 Hypotheses and their empirical implementation
In this section we derive hypotheses from the results of the theoretical analysis
concerning the propensity to patent with horizontally differentiated products.
Our first hypothesis stems from the basic mechanism of the model: the lower
the fixed costs of market entry are, the more firms are able to enter the mar-
ket. As the mandatory disclosure of information can be used by competitors
in their attempts to invent around the patent, patenting reduces market en-
try costs and thus facilitates market entry. Thus we come to the following
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 The propensity to patent increases when market entry costs
decrease.
When the initial market entry costs are high, they form an effective barrier
to entry. The innovator may thus choose not to patent as then he would
face the drawback from the disclosure of information without profiting from
the protective effect. If market entry costs decrease, i.e. more firms are
able to enter, patenting becomes profitable as it protects at least part of
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the product space from the entry of rivals. Consequently the propensity to
patent increases when the fixed costs of market entry decrease.
Recall from the theoretical model that the critical threshold for a restrictive
patent is βcrit = 2/N s. Whenever a patent is not restrictive it has no pro-
tective effect and is thus not profitable for the innovator. If the disclosure
requirement has no impact, which means that the number of competitors
will not increase by patenting, every restrictive patent solely has a positive
protective effect and the innovator will choose to patent. As ∂βcrit/∂N s < 0,
the critical threshold for patent breadth decreases as the number of firms
in the market rises. This enlarges the range in which a patent is restrictive
and consequently the propensity to patent increases. These results can be
condensed to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 Whenever the disclosure requirement has no impact, the propen-
sity to patent rises with the number of firms operating in the market.
Due to the impact of the disclosure requirement by patenting market entry
costs decrease to fP ≡ αfs. Thus the change of market entry costs by
patenting can be defined as ∆f ≡ (1 − α)fs. The innovator’s profits with a
patent are higher, the lower the change of market entry costs, ∆f , as then
less firms are able to enter the market due to the impact of the disclosure
requirement. Hence, the decision to patent is crucially influenced by the
strength of the disclosure effect.
Market entry costs with a patent (fP ) and with secrecy (fs) drive this result
as follows: On the one hand a rise of fs results in a higher entry barrier so
that patenting becomes obsolete and consequently the propensity to patent
decreases. On the other hand the lower the reduction of market entry costs
due to patenting, i.e. the higher fP , the lower is the impact of the disclosure
requirement so that patenting becomes more profitable and the propensity
to patent rises. Thus, we come to the following hypothesis2
Hypothesis 3 Whenever the disclosure requirement has an impact, the propen-
sity to patent decreases with the strength of the disclosure effect.
As stated in Hypotheses 2 and 3, the decision to patent is mainly driven by
patent breadth (protective effect) and the impact of the disclosure require-
ment (disclosure effect). The patenting propensity substantially varies sub-
ject to the intensity of the disclosure effect. The main result of the model by
Zaby (2009) is that if the disclosure requirement has no impact, the patent-
ing decision solely depends on the protective effect, i.e. the propensity to
2This Hypothesis corresponds to Corollary 1 of the theoretical model.
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patent increases with the intensity of patent protection, β (Proposition 1,
p. 22). Further, if the disclosure requirement has an impact, the patenting
decision depends on the number of firms operating in the market as well as
on the extent of patent protection (Proposition 2, p. 23). We translate these
theoretical results into the following empirical equation:
P = β0 + β1N ∗RE + β2fs + β3fs ∗RE + β4N
s + β5RE + Controls,
where P denotes the patenting decision, N the number of firms operating
in the market (initial market structure), RE reflects the easiness of substi-
tutability as a proxy for the impact of the disclosure requirement and fs are
the cost of market entry with secrecy.
As elaborated earlier, due to ∂βcrit/∂N s < 0 a change in N is an adequate
measure for variations of the critical threshold of patent breadth. If the
disclosure effect is low since substitutability is difficult, the driving force
behind the decision to patent is the critical threshold of the intensity of
patent protection, βcrit. The more firms enter, the lower this threshold will
be, and thus the higher is the propensity to patent. Thus, following our
theoretical results, we expect a positive effect of N on the propensity to
patent.
To capture the distinction between the cases the disclosure requirement has
an impact and the disclosure requirement has no impact, we include the in-
teraction terms N ∗ RE and fs ∗ RE. Whenever the dummy variable RE
indicating the easiness of substitutability takes the value 0, the disclosure
requirement has no impact and thus the interaction terms vanish and only
the sole effects of N and fs prevail. Whenever the disclosure requirement
has an impact, RE = 1, the interaction terms additionally influence the sole
effects and the overall effect is given by the sum of both effects.3
To capture market entry costs (fs) we use the firms’ assessment of the threat
of market entry by new competitors. Whenever firms see their market posi-
tion strongly threatened by market entry, we conjecture that market entry
costs are low. According to our theoretical model the single effect of fs
should be negative: as market entry costs with secrecy rise, the barrier to
entry increases so that the usefulness of a patent diminishes, resulting in a
decrease of the propensity to patent. However, the interaction term with the
easiness of substitutability, fs ∗RE, which reflects the market entry costs of
competitors accounting for an impact of the disclosure requirement, should
have a positive effect on patenting.
3Note that this computation of an overall effect is only feasible if the marginal effects
of both variables are significantly distinct from each other.
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4 Data set
The basis for the empirical analysis is the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP)
of the year 2005. The MIP is an annual survey which is conducted by the
Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) Mannheim. The aim of the
survey is to provide a tool to investigate the innovation behavior of German
manufacturing and service firms. Regularly – currently every two years – the
MIP is the German contribution of Community Innovation Survey (CIS).
Our empirical investigations are based on about 740 firms.
In the year 2005, the survey contained additional questions concerning the
firm’s perception of the competitive situation. Questions concerning the char-
acteristics and the importance of specific competitive factors like price or
quality are asked as well as the perceived competitive situation with respect
to the number of competitors and their relative size.
4.1 Sample and Variable Definition
In this section we test the hypotheses derived from the theoretical model
reflecting the patenting behavior in a market with horizontally differentiated
products. A central assumption to the theoretical analysis is that the success-
ful inventor commercializes his invention immediately, thereby opening a new
market. To implement this in empirical terms, we restrict our data to firms
which indicate that their innovation activities resulted in the establishment
of new markets. As before we only include innovating firms.
In the restricted data set we have 45% of firms indicating that they applied
for a patent in the considered time period. As stated earlier a variable reflect-
ing the easiness of substitutability is used as a proxy for the impact of the
disclosure requirement, RE. Descriptive statistics reveal that nearly 70% of
firms find that their competitive environment is characterized by easy to sub-
stitute products. The theoretical model finds a critical threshold for patent
scope indicating whether a patent has a restricting effect or not. This critical
threshold decreases, the more firms operate in the market in the absence of a
patent. Naturally it is not straightforward to implement the actual number
of firms operating in a market empirically. Nevertheless the MIP provides
a categorical variable displaying the ranges of the number of competitors as
perceived by a firm.4 We thus use a dummy variable large number of firms
which indicates that a respondent firm has more than 15 competitors. In our
data set this is the case for 16% of all firms.
4The ranges are defined as follows: no competitors, 1 to 5 competitors, 6 to 15 com-
petitors and more than 15 competitors.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Patenting De-
cision Estimation with Horizontally Differentiated
Products
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
patent 0.442 0.497 0 1
market entry costs 0.105 0.306 0 1
large number of firms 0.158 0.365 0 1
reverse engineering 0.687 0.464 0 1
MEC * rev. eng. 0.084 0.278 0 1
firms * rev. eng. 0.120 0.326 0 1
log(employees) 4.305 1.673 0 9.077
human capital 0.243 0.255 0.000 1.000
R&D intensity 0.065 0.273 0.000 6.427
capital intensity 0.109 0.272 0.000 4.554
EU 0.584 0.493 0 1
non EU 0.409 0.492 0 1
customer power 0.300 0.458 0 1
cooperation 0.368 0.483 0 1
east 0.321 0.467 0 1
In default of a corresponding measure in MIP 2005, we refer to a firm’s per-
ception on whether its market position is threatened by the entry of new
rivals as a proxy for initial market entry costs, fs. We argument that when-
ever a firm perceives its market position as strongly threatened by market
entry, initial market entry costs, the initial barrier to entry, are low, this is
found relevant by 10% of firms.
As described above we include the interaction terms firms * rev. eng. and
MEC * rev. eng. Descriptive statistics show that the first, which captures the
change in the number of firms due to the impact of the disclosure requirement,
is relevant for 12% of all firms while the latter, which reflects the perceived
market entry costs if substitutability plays an important role, is relevant for
8% of firms.
We include firm size, human capital, customer power, the geographical mar-
kets EU and non-EU, cooperation and east as control variables. For defini-
tions refer to Section ??, for descriptive statistics see Table 1.
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Furthermore, we control for several factors that may influence our dependent
variables. Firm size is represented by the number of employees in the year
2002, human capital by the share of employees holding a university degree.
Finally we describe the competitive situation with respect to the geographical
dimension of the product market. We control for two world regions, the
EU and non-EU. Germany is considered separately as it serves as reference
category in the regression. Thus it is not contained in the variable EU.
In order to capture the fact that the market may be characterized by ad-
ditional market entry barriers other than the one considered as explanatory
variable for initial market entry costs, fs, we control for capital intensity
defined as tangible assets per employee and for R&D intensity defined as
expenditures for in-house R&D activities per sales.
Further we control for regional and sectoral differences by including an in-
dicator whether the firm is located in eastern Germany (east) and define 11
industry dummies. For the definition of the industry dummies see Table 3 in
the Appendix.
5 Empirical results
To test the influence of the protective effect as well as the impact of the
disclosure requirement on the patenting decision we estimate a probit model
and calculate marginal effects evaluated at the sample means. The marginal
effects of the interaction terms are calculated according to Cornelißen, Son-
derhof (2009). Results are presented in Table 2.
According to our first Hypothesis 1, a decrease of market entry costs should
result in a higher probability to patent, i.e. if a high threat of entry is per-
ceived, the propensity to patent should increase. Recall that the interaction
term of market entry costs with the easiness of substitutability, MEC ∗RE
reflects the market entry costs of competitors if the innovator patented and
thus accounts for the impact of the disclosure requirement. To capture the
entire effect of market entry costs – with and without patenting – we evaluate
the sole effect and the effect combined with the easiness of substitutability.
We find a negative marginal effect concerning the sole effect of market entry
costs and a positive effect of the interaction term. As the latter effect is sig-
nificantly higher than the sole effect, the overall effect of market entry costs
is positive and is thus in line with Hypothesis 1.
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Table 2: Results of the Patenting Decision Estimation with
Horizontally Differentiated Products
Marginal Effect Standard Error
reverse engineering 0.002 0.044
market entry costs -0.142** 0.062
large number of firms -0.056 0.058
MEC * rev. eng. 0.305*** 0.106
firms * rev. eng. -0.329** 0.143
log(employees) 0.112*** 0.017
human capital 0.246** 0.109
R&D intensity 1.405*** 0.303
capital intensity -0.185 0.147
EU 0.070 0.049
non EU 0.082* 0.048
customer power -0.059 0.044
cooperation 0.234*** 0.044
east -0.105** 0.043
industry dummies included
Log likelihood -372.83
McFadden’s adjusted R2 0.346
χ2(all) 395.00***
χ2(ind) 62.59***
Number of observations 831
*** (**, *) indicate significance of 1 % (5 %, 10 %) respectively.
This table depicts marginal effects of a probit estimation regarding
the determinants of the patenting decision. Marginal effects are
calculated at the sample means and those of the interaction terms
are obtained according to Cornelißen, Sonderhof (2009). Standard
errors are calculated with the delta method.
χ2(all) displays a test on the joint significance of all variables.
χ2(ind) displays a test on the joint significance of the industry
dummies. For a definition of the industry dummies refer to Table 3.
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Hypothesis 2 derived from the theoretical model states that whenever the
disclosure requirement has no impact, the propensity to patent rises with
the number of firms operating in the market. As we find a non-significant
effect of the number of firms, we are not able to confirm the hypothesis.
Obviously, in the absence of easy substitutability an increase of the number
of firms, i.e. a decrease of the critical threshold of patent intensity, has no
impact on the patenting decision. This can be due to the fact that the lack
of substitutability serves as a natural entry barrier perceived as sufficiently
high protection thus making patenting obsolete. Hypothesis 3 regards the
case in which the disclosure requirement has an impact which following our
empirical implementation translates into the fact that substitutability is easy
(RE = 1). According to the theoretical model, the disclosure effect affects
the propensity to patent in two interdependent ways: (i) by affecting market
entry costs and (ii) by thereby affecting the number of entering firms. At the
same time the sole effect of disclosure has no impact on the patenting behavior
(iii). We test this hypothesis looking at these three effects: (i) the interaction
of easy substitutability with market entry costs to document the impact
of the disclosure requirement on market entry costs, (ii) the interaction of
easy substitutability with the number of firms in a market which reflects
the effect of the disclosure requirement on the number of entering firms and
finally (iii) the single effect of the disclosure requirement.5 As conjectured we
find a positive effect of the interaction term MEC * rev. eng. showing that
in the case of easy substitutability decreasing market entry costs increase
the probability of patenting. The second interaction term firms * rev. eng.
revealing the effect of the number of entering firms in the presence of easy
substitutability turns out to be negative, which is in line with the proposed
effect. Further, as we proposed, the sole effect of easy substitutability is
insignificant.
We find significant effects for firm size, R&D intensity, geographical markets
EU and non-EU and east. Additionally, we confirm a significant positive
impact of human capital, i.e. a higher share of highly qualified employees
increases firms probability to apply for patents.
6 Conclusion
From our theoretical analysis of the propensity to patent in a market with
horizontally differentiated products we deduced three hypothesis. The first,
5Note that the single effect of easy substitutability has to be interpreted as the disclosure
effect when neither the dummy variable MEC nor the dummy variable large number of
firms takes unit value.
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Hypothesis 1, concerns a basic mechanism of the circular city model: if mar-
ket entry costs decrease, more firms enter the market. To mitigate this effect,
the innovator can patent as this forms an alternative barrier to entry. Thus
the hypothesis states that the propensity to patent increases when market
entry costs decrease. However, patenting has the drawback of mandatory
disclosure which could in turn outweigh the positive protective effect. Our
empirical estimation looks at the interdependency of both aspects as we con-
sider the sole effect of market entry costs as well as the interaction of the
impact of the disclosure requirement with market entry costs. We find an
overall positive effect and can thus confirm the Hypothesis.
The following hypotheses distinguish the case that the disclosure requirement
has an impact, i.e. more firms are able to enter due to a patent, and the
case that the disclosure requirement has no impact, i.e. patenting does not
change the number of entering firms. If it has no impact, Hypothesis 2
suggests that the propensity to patent decreases with the number of firms
operating in the market. This finding cannot be confirmed: possibly the lack
of substitutability forms a barrier to entry sufficiently high to make patenting
obsolete. If the disclosure requirement has an impact, Hypothesis 3 proposes
that the probability to patent decreases with the strength of the disclosure
effect. From the theoretical model we know that this effect is twofold as
the disclosure effect influences market entry costs and thereby also affects
the number of entering firms. The empirical estimation finds both effects
significantly influencing the propensity to patent in the proposed manner:
the interaction term of market entry costs and reverse engineering has a
positive effect while the interaction term of the number of firms and reverse
engineering has a negative effect.
Overall, concerning the propensity to patent in markets with horizontally
differentiated products, we find that patents can serve the innovator as an
additional barrier to entry when the initial fixed costs of market entry de-
crease. Furthermore the empirical findings propose that the strength of the
disclosure effect is in fact decisive for the innovator’s patenting decision.
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Appendix
Table 3: Definition of Industry Dummies
ind NACE code description
1 1, 15, 17, 18, 19 agriculture, food, textile, leather
2 10, 14, 23, 40, 41 mining, coke, fuel, electricity
3 20, 21, 36, 37, 90 wood, paper, publishing, printing,
furniture, recycling, sewage
4 24, 25, 26 chemicals and pharmaceuticals,
plastics, non-metallic mineral products, glass
5 27, 28 metals
6 29, 34, 350, 351, 352, 354, 355 machinery, motor vehicles without aerospace
7 30, 31, 32 office machinery, electrical machinery,
radio television communication
8 33, 353 medical, precision and optical
instruments, aerospace
9 64, 72 telecommunication, post and communication,
computer services
10 73 research & development
11 74 business activities
Industry category 11 is the reference category and is not included in regressions.
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